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SCHAUER, J.-I concur. I think it should be mentioned, 
however, that although in seeking prohibition petitioner ap-
pears to have mistaken his remedy, the denial of the petition 
is without prejudice, and is completely unrelated, to a possible 
remedy by motion in the trial court to dismiss the action on 
the ground that the facts bring the case within the provisions 
of section 581a of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
Such facts, as related in the main opinion, show that more 
than three years elapsed between the time the action was filed 
against petitioner (defendant in such action) and the time 
summons was served on him, and also that he remained a 
resident of California for more than three years after the 
action was filed. Under such circumstances, in the absence of 
a showing of facts suspending operation of the statute, it 
would seem to be the duty of the court on motion of the peti-
tioner or of its own motion to dismiss the main action. 
[L.A. No. 22189. In Bank. Aug. 11, 1953.] 
Estate of RUBY SARGA V AK, Deceased. H. KURKJIAN 
et al., Appellants, v. J. G. OHANNESON et al., Re-
spondents. 
[1] Appeal-Law of Case-Probate Matters.-Although Supreme 
Court, on former appeal, affirmed order admitting a holographic 
instrument to probate as a codicil to a previously admitted 
witnessed will, such decision is not the law of the case in sub-
sequent proceedings to determine heirship where opinion of 
Supreme Court, on former appeal, expressly stated that court 
was concerned only with question of whether codicil was in-
tended as a testamentary document and not with meaning of 
instrument, whereas court in present proceedings is concerned 
with the meaning, namely, whether there was an intent to 
create a trust. 
[2] Wills-Estates or Interests Devised-Trusts.-To impose a 
trust on property bequeathed it must appear that testator 
intended to impose mandatory duties. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 706; Am.Jur., Appeal 
and Error, § 985 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1348; [2] Wills, 
§377; [3] Wills, §370; [4] Wills, §202; [5] Wills, §274; [6] 
Wills, §§273, 274; [7] Wills, §294; [8] Wills, §292(6); [9] 
Trusts, § 142; [10] Trusts, § 291. 
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!d.-Estates or Interests Devised-Later Words as Limiting 
Gifts Made.-vVhere an absolute estate has been devised by 
will, that estate will not be limited by subsequent words unless 
they indicate as clear an intention therefor as was shown by 
words creating the estate. (Prob. Code, § 104.) 
[4] Id.- Testamentary Writings- Showing of Intent.- While 
declarations of testator before and after execution of will are 
admissible for purpose of ascertaining intent with which in-
strument was executed, they are not admissible for purpose 
of proving the meaning testator attributed to specific pro-
visions of admitted will. 
[5) Id.- Construction- Consideration of Surrounding Circum-
stances.-In case of uncertainty arising on face of will, the 
trier of fact may consider such matters as size of estate, prop-
erty involved in gift, circumstances of the parties and their 
relation to each other and to testator. 
Id.- Construction- Intention of Testator.-When an uncer-
tainty arises on face of a will as to meaning of any of its 
provisions, testator's intent is to be ascertained from words 
of will, but circumstances of its execution may be taken into 
consideration, excluding oral declarations of testator as to his 
intentions. 
[7] !d.-Construction-Extrinsic Bvidence.-A holographic instru-
ment admitted to probate as a codicil to a witnessPd will and 
stating that writer is acting of her own free will and that she 
"leaves everything she has" to her "boy" and her lawyer, gives 
them power of attorney to divide what is left of her belongings 
"to them," and wants it understood that a certain named 
woman is to have nothing, is positive and unequivocal, and 
extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show a trust. 
[8] !d.-Construction-Mandatory and Precatory Words.-Where 
the person directed to carry out testator's wishes is both execu-
tor and legatee, the strict rule which imposes a mandatory duty 
on executor is not followed and the words are treated as being 
addressed to him in his capacity as legatee. 
(9] Trusts-Constructive Trusts-Breach of Agreement by Devisee 
or Legatee.-Where testator devises or bequeaths property to 
a person in reliance on his agreement to hold the property in 
trust, the devisee or legatee holds the property on a construc-
tive trust for the person for whom he agreed to hold it. 
[4] See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 186 et seq.; Am.Jur., Wills, § 8 et seq. 
[9] Devise or legacy on promise of devisee or legatee that an-
other shall benefit as creating trust, note, 66 A.L.R. 156. See, also, 
Cal.Jur., Trusts, § 45. 
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[10] !d.-Actions to Establish-Jurisdiction.-Probate court is not 
the appropriate forum in which to establish a constructive 
trust; it must be litigated in an independent proceeding in 
equity. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County determining heirship. Joseph W. Vickers, 
,Judge. Affirmed. 
Cameron & Perkins, William Kinley, Simpson & \Vise aml 
George E. Wise for Appellants. 
C. vV. Byrer, Charles E. Hobart, Robert M. Dulin, Spurgeon 
Avakian and Melvin E. :B1 ink for Respondents. 
CAHTER, J.-'l1his is an appeal from an order in proceed-
ings to determine heirship in the estate of Ruby Sargavak, 
deceased, initiated by nephews and nieces, the only heirs of 
Mrs. Sargavak. J. G. Ohanneson and Samuel G. Mahdesian, 
the legatees in the codicil later mentioned, were declared by 
the order to be entitled to the entire estate under the codicil. 
" It appears that in 1945 Mrs. Sargavak made a witnessed 
will in which she named her heirs as legatees and Mahdesian 
as executor. That will was admitted to probate and a contest 
filed on the ground of mental incapacity. Following a verdict 
for contestants the probate court granted to proponents a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. That judgment was 
reversed on appeal (Estate of Sargavak, 95 Cal.App.2d 73 
[212 P.2d 541]) and judgment entered on the verdict. The 
trial court then granted a motion for a new trial, and ap-
parently that proceeding has not progressed beyond that 
stage. 
Shortly after the 1945 will was offered for probate a holo-
graphic instrument, dated September 29, 1946, was offered 
for probate as a codicil to the 1945 will. It reads: 
"To vVHOM IT MAY CoNCERN: 
"1566 W-29th St. 
Los Angeles 7, Cal. 
Sep 29, 1946 
Sunday Evening 
''I the writer-Mrs. Ruby Sargavak wants everyone to know 
that she is writing these lines of her own free will-no one 
is putting her ef or urging her to do it. She leaves every-
thing she has to her Boy Sam Mahdesian & her layer, J. G. 
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Ohanneson-she gives them power of attorney to divide what 
is left of her belongings to them. She specifically advises to 
give nothing what so ever to Mrs. Lillian Shooshan-she is no 
relation nor friend of hers-Mrs. Sargavak has been more than 
kind to her, just because she begged us to help her for a little 
time-Mrs. Sargavak would rather help her very own nieces 
& grand nieces & perfect strangers, who are truly in need of 
help. God has been good to us, she did not appreciate the 
goodness of the Lord to her. All honor & glory unto his High 
and Holy Name! Mrs. Ruby Sargavak. P. S. It is 8 o'clock, 
I am very tired--
Ruby Sargavak." 
Its probate was contested by Mrs. Sargavak's heirs on the 
ground that she did not intend it as testamentary disposition 
of her property. Extrinsic evidence was received on that 
question and it was ordered admitted to probate. On appeal 
it was claimed that the evidence without contradiction showed 
no testamentary intent and also that extrinsic evidence was 
not admissible. The order was affirmed, this court stating 
that "we are here concerned not with the meaning of the 
instrument (codicil), but with the intention with which it 
1vas executed.'' (Estate of Sargavak, 35 Cal.2d 93, 96 [216 
P.2cl850, 21 .A.L.R.2d 307] .) We held that extrinsic evidence 
was admissible to show whether the testator intended the 
codicil to be effective. 
In the instant heirship proceedings initiated by decedent's 
heirs the latter asserted that it was her intent by the codicil 
that the property go to Ohanneson and Mahdesian in trust for 
persons other than Mrs. Shooshan and that they have power 
of attomey to divide it between the other persons, but as the 
beneficiaries of the trust were uncertain (the claimed bene-
ficiaries being decedent's nieces and nephews and strangers) 
the trnst failed and the property would pass by intestate 
succession to the heirs. The court refused to permit the heirs 
to introouce any extrinsic evidence to show that the intent 
was that claimed by them and determined that Ohanneson 
and Mahdesian took the property absolutely, and that no trust 
was intended by the codicil. 
'J'be heirs, petitioners in the heirship proceedings, assert 
error, claiming that the codicil was ambiguous on its face and 
extrinsic evidence was admissible to show a trust. In this 
eonnection they contend that this court's decision in the 
former appeal ( h-:sta.te of Sargavak, supra, 35 Cal.2d 93) 
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established that such evidence was admissible. The extrinsic 
evidence sought to be introduced by petitioners consisted of 
the circumstances surrounding the making of the will such 
as the size of the estate, the property involved and the cir-
cumstances and relations of the parties involved; and oral 
declarations of the testatrix such as were mentioned in Estate 
of Sargavak, s1tpra, 35 Cal.2d 93, including her statement to 
Mahdesian in referring to the codicil-that she wanted Ohanne-
son, her attorney, and him, as her executor, to take care of 
her estate the way he knew she wanted it. 
[1] Referring to the last contention first (the effect of 
the decision in the former appeal on this case), it is clear that 
the decision on the former appeal has no bearing upon the 
present case. As above mentioned it was there expressly stated 
in the forepart of the opinion that the court was concerned 
only with the question of whether the codicil was intended as 
a testamentary document and not with the meaning of the 
instrument. Here we are concerned with the meaning-
whether there was an intent to create a trust. It is true, as 
stated by Ohanneson and Mahdesian, that we there said, in 
discussing the evidence on the question of testamentary in-
tent, that nothing indicated an intent that decedent did not 
leave the property to those persons, that there was evidence 
of such intent because of the close association between dece-
dent and them and that the purpose to leave her property to 
them was expressed by the instrument. But that discussion 
was aimed solely at the question of whether she intended to 
make a will and not as to the meaning of the will-as to 
whether their interest should be absolute. The only thing 
before the court was whether the codicil was a will and no 
question of construction was involved. (See Estate of Sal-
monski, 38 Cal.2d 199 [238 P.2d 966].) 
The statutes on the subject of the admissibility of ex-
trinsic evidence in the construction of wills provide : ''A clear 
and distinct devise or bequest cannot be affected by any 
reasons assigned therefor, or by any other words not equally 
clear and distinct, or by inference or argument from other 
parts of the will, or by an inaccurate recital of or reference 
to its contents in another part of the will.'' (Pro b. Code, 
§ 104.) "\Vhen there is an imperfect description, or no person 
or property exactly answers the description, mistakes and 
omissions must be corrected, if the error appears from the 
context of the will or from extrinsic evidence, excluding the 
Aug.1953] EsTATE oF SARGAVAK 
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oral declarations of the testator as to his intentions; and 
when an uncertainty arises upon the face of a will, as to the 
application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention 
is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking into 
view the circumstances under which it was made, excluding 
such oral declarations." (Prob. Code, § 105.) Recently this 
court has stated the rules of construction and on the ad-
missibility of extrinsic evidence. [2, 3] To impose a trust 
upon property bequeathed it must appear that the testator 
intended to impose mandatory duties, and where an absolute 
estate has been devised by will, that estate will not be limited 
by subsequent words unless they indicate as clear an in-
tention therefor as was shown by the words creating the estate 
(Estate of Collias, 37 Cal.2d 587 [233 P.2d 554]; Estate of 
](earns, 36 Cal.2d 531 [225 P.2d 218] ; Prob. Code, § 104, 
s1tpra). [4] While declarations of the testator before and 
after the execution of the will are admissible for the purpose 
of ascertaining the intent with which the instrument was 
executed, they are not admissible ''for the purpose of proving 
the meaning the testator attributed to specific provisions of 
the admitted will. [Citations.] 'Such ... declarations of in-
tent to make a will are admissible when the attempt is not to 
explain an ambiguity but to show the testamentary character 
of a letter.' " (Estate of Sargavak, supra, 35 Cal.2d 93, 97.) 
In Estate of Kearns, s11pra,, 36 Cal.2d 531, the court was con-
sidering whether a clear dispositive clause of a will was 
modified by a later clause which seemed to indicate, by 
allegedly precatory words, the creation of a trust. We con-
cluded that the later clause was not as clear as the dispositive 
clause and hence under section 104 of the Probate Code, 
supra, a trust was not created unless the intent of the testator 
to do so can be shown by extrinsic evidence and ''Section 
104 must be read with section 105 of the Probate Code which 
provides that 'when an. uncertainty arises upon the face of a 
will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's 
intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will, 
taking into view the circumstances under which it was made, 
excluding . . . oral declarations' of the testator as to his 
intentions." (Estate of Kearns, supra, 36 Cal.2d 531, 537.) 
[5] As there was an "uncertainty" on the face of the will 
the trier of fact may consider such matters "as the size of 
the estate, the property involved in the gift, the circumstances 
of the parties and their relation to each other and to the 
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testator.'' In other words, oral declarations of the testator 
are not admissible but circumstances may be shown where 
there is an uncertainty. [6] Or as was said in Estate of 
8almonski, supra, 38 Cal.2d 199, 214: "When an uncertainty 
arises upon the face of a will as to the meaning of any of its 
provisions, the testator's intent is to be ascertained from the 
words of the will, but the circumstances of the execution 
thereof may be taken into consideration, excluding the oral 
declarations of the testator as to his intentions .... But 
'where the intent is plain' from the words used, 'the duty of 
the court is to declare that intent, without regard to the con-
sequences.' '' As in the Kearns case, the question here pre-
sented is whether the testatrix intended to create a trust 
rather than an ascertainment of who are the beneficiaries 
thereof if one was created, hence it is not a case of determin-
ing an ''imperfect description'' or where no ''person exactly 
answers the description'' as contemplated by the first clause 
of section 105 of the Probate Code, s1tpra. The problem is 
whether a trust was intended at all for any beneficiaries, not 
who those beneficiaries might be after it has been determined 
that a trust was intended. 'fhus it is not a question of ascer-
taining the objects or property of the testator's bounty, and 
cases on that issue relied upon by petitioners are not appli-
cable. 
[7] Decisive on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence is, 
therefore, the presence or absence of uncertainty in the codicil. 
That there is no uncertainty is plain considering the codicil 
and rules of construction applicable. The bequest to Mah-
desian and Ohanneson, hereafter referred to as legatees, is 
positive and unequivocal. 'l'he testatrix declares that she 
''leaves everything she has'' to her ''boy'' Mahdesian (he 
was not her son) and her lawyer Ohanneson. True, she goes 
on to state that she ''gives them power of attorney to divide 
what is left of her belongings to them," but the giving of the 
power of attorney does not indicate a trust as it is only an 
authorization to the legatees to divide the property between 
them, merely another way of saying that she leaves it to them 
with full power to take charge of it and divide it. It is clear 
that when she said she gave power of attorney to ''them'' 
the "them" referred to the legatees, and it clearly follows 
that the second ''them'' in the same clause also refers to the 
legatees. There is no relation between that "them" and the 
nieces and grandnieces and strangers later mentioned. She 
states that Mrs. Shooshan is to be given nothing, undoubtedly 
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a possibility that the legatees might give her some-
an eventuality ·which she wants to avoid because of her 
toward Mrs. Shooshan. The references to nieces and 
and "perfect" strangers is a further expression 
of her dislike for Mrs. Shooshan, it being stated that she would 
rather help them than Mrs. Shooshan, indicating that she did 
not even see fit to help such persons. ·when she refers to what 
js "left of her belongings" she plainly means what is left at 
the time she dies or after the creditors and expenses of 
administration have been paid. 
It is urged that becanse :M:ahdesian was named executor 
in the 1945 will (none was named in the codicil) and that will 
stands as far as it appoints an executor, a presumption arises 
that the bequest to him was intended to be in trust. It is 
not known now whether the 1945 will will withstand the 
contest as a new trial has been granted and the outcome is not 
known as above mentioned. Aside from that, however, the 
law is not as claimed by petitioners. Even if :M:ahdesian was 
named as executor in the codicil it still appears that he is 
clearly made a legatee, and any power of attorney does not ap-
pear to be addressed to him as executor. [8] ""Where the person 
directed to carry out the wishes of the testator is both executor 
and legatee, the courts in construing the effect of the language 
have refused to follow the strict rule which imposes a manda-
tory duty on the executor and have apparently treated the 
words as being addressed to him in his capacity as legatee.'' 
(Estate of J(eat'ns, supra, 36 Cal.2cl531, 534; Estate of Collias, 
snpra, 37 Cal.2d 587, 590.) 
[9] It may be noted that some of the extrinsic evidence 
to which reference is made in Estate of Sargavak, supra, 35 
Cal.2cl 93, might indicate that there was an oral agreement be-
tween the testatrix and Ohanneson and :M:ahdesian that they 
would hold the property received by them under the codicil 
for petitioners or some of them. Such an oral agreement 
could be proved by extrinsic evidence and a constructive trust 
would arise in favor of the beneficiaries, for "\Vhere a testator 
devises or bequeaths property to a person in reliance upon 
his agreement to hold the property in trust, the devisee or 
legatee holds the property upon a constructive trust for the 
person for whom he agreed to hold it.'' (Rest., Trusts, § 55; 
see Sears v. Rule, 27 Cal.2d 131 [163 P.2d 443] ; Beck v. 
West Coast Life Ins. Co., 38 Cal.2d 643 [241 P.2d 544, 26 
41 C.2d-11 
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A.hH.2d 9791; Orella v. Johnson. ~~S Cal.2d 69:1 [242 P.2d 
Dl I ; 2:1 CrJl.,J nr.· 177.) [10] '!'he probate court is not, how·-
ever, the appropriatr formn in which to establish such a 
trust; it must be litigated in an independent proceeding in 
equity. (Sca1·s v. Rule, supra, 27 Cal.2cll31; Estate of Morelli, 
102 Cal.App.2d 39 [226 P.2d 716].) Hence, the question can-
not be considered in the instant proceeding. 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, 
.J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 22222. In Bank. Aug. l"J,, 1953.] 
ELBERT, L'rD. (a Corporation), Respondent, v. JOSEPH 
l\L GROSS, Appellant. 
[1] Streets-Improvement Act of 1911-Sale for Nonpayment of 
Bonds-Notice.-In that part of Sts. & Hy. Code, § 6550 
(based on Improvement Act of 1911) which, prior to its 
amendment in 1950, made service of notice ~upon the owner 
of the property purchased, or his agent if he is named in 
the certificate of sale" a condition precedent to obtaining a 
city treasurer's deed on foreclosure of a street improvement 
bond, the fact that the clause "if he is named in the certifi-
cate of sale" and the word "agent" both appeared in the same 
part of the sentence and were separated from the word 
"owner" by a comma shows that the evident purpose of such 
punctuation was to limit the qualifying clause to "agent." 
[2] Statutes-Construction-Language of Statute.-A limiting 
clause in a statute is to be confined to the last antecedent, 
unless context or evident meaning of statute requires a 
different construction. 
[3] Streets-Improvement Act of 1911-Sale for Nonpayment of 
Bonds-Notice.-In its original form, Sts. & Hy. Code, § 6550, 
required notice to be served on owner of property as pre-
requisite to validity of city treasurer's deed issued on fore-
closure of street improvement bond unless name of owner's 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 708. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 4, 7-9, 11] Streets, § 414(1); [2] 
.Statutes, § 125; [5] Statutes, § 73; [6] Statutes, § 191; [10] 
Streets, § 414(3); [12] Streets, § 414(2); [13] Appeal and 
Error, § 150. 
